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is the report of forensic psychologist expert Michael Weiner. The
Weiner report showed that Khadr was mature beyond his years
and responsible for his actions. Ultimately, Omar was considered a
valuable prisoner because of his intellect and the fact that he had
been “too close” to Bin Laden on a personal basis. Nevertheless, the
real embarrassment was Canada’s slow response to his incarceration,
unlike Australia and Great Britain, where the arrest of its citizens
involved with Al-Qaeda were quickly dealt with. What is required of
csis, according to the authors, is reform in watchdog organizations and
greater public accountability in the interest of human rights (p. 519).
In spite of its problems of exclusion in the research into more
recent history, Secret Service provides a comprehensive overview
of the evolution of Canada’s capabilities and objectives in political
policing. The information is presented in a refreshingly jargon-free
manner, in contrast to a number of works which discuss the overall
idea that the state assumed that white middle class values were under
siege in the twentieth century. Readers vaguely familiar with the
course of Canadian history in this period will find the book easy to
follow, since it is presented chronologically rather than thematically
and, for the most part, sticks to a rigid formula of history of events:
including the Fenian raids, the Winnipeg General Strike, The October
Crisis, the ongoing War on Terror.
CURTIS B. ROBINSON, INDEPENDENT RESEARCHER

And A ll Their Glory Past: Fort Erie, Plattsburgh and the Final
Battles in the North, 1814. Donald Graves. Montreal: Robin Brass
Studios, 2013. Pp. 400.
Donald Graves has again contributed to the historiography of the
War of 1812 with And A ll Their Glory Past: Fori. Erie, Plattsburgh
and the Final Battles in the North, 1814. Part of a trilogy that
includes Where Right, and Glory Lead! The Battle of Lundy’s Lane,
1814 (1997), and Field of Glory: The Battle of Grysler’s Farm (1999),
the author’s purpose in And A ll Their Glory Past is to describe the
concluding campaigns of the war -those on the Niagara peninsula,
the Plattsburg campaign, the British amphibious operations on the
American seaboard, and McArthur’s Raid in what was then western
Canada. Graves covers both land and naval aspects of the campaign
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and demonstrates, in the carefully organized five parts of this book,
a superlative narrative style and an ability to correct long-standing
myths.
In the first two parts of the book, Graves provides a detailed and
well-balanced account of the lead up to and then the night assault on
Fort Erie. The American troops had the better of this encounter with
the British being plagued by difficulties. The British commander,
Lieutenant-General Gordon Drummond, did not assault the works
when he first closed up to them and when they were most vulnerable.
Subsequent bad fortune included Lieutenant-Colonel John Tucker’s
failure at Conjocto Creek on the 2 August, the nine days lost in
the preparation of the position of No. 1 artillery battery, and its
poor placement— it was too far from the fort walls to effectively
create a breach. The explosion of a small magazine in the American
position late on the 14 August, after barely twenty-two hours of
bombardment, led Drummond to order the assault for that night. The
timing seems to confirm Graves’ opinion of the British army’s lack of
siege warfare expertise, as the fort’s walls had not been breached nor
the bombardment long enough to wear down the American defenders
significantly. Drummond directed a major portion of his forces against
the left side of the American lines, which had been unmolested
by shelling. It failed disastrously, as Drummond had ordered the
assaulting De Watteville Regiment to remove their flints from their
rifles to preserve secrecy in their approach march. In their subsequent
confused milling before the walls of the fort, they were easily shot
down by the alert and waiting Americans. The attack on the right
side of the fort nearly succeeded, but when an unexpected explosion
in the captured demi-bastion caused massive British casualties the
assault was spent. That evening cost Drummond 905 officers and
men, the second highest loss the British army experienced in a single
engagement in the war.
After this failed assault, there was a vigorous application of the
spade on both sides of the front. The Americans further reinforced
Fort Erie while Drummond extended his siege lines by adding
outposts and two additional batteries, No. 2 and No. 3. The opponents
skirmished continually, trading gun and shell fire on a daily basis. Due
to the limited amount of artillery ammunition available, the weight
of the daily British bombardment was weak but sufficiently galling
to provoke the Americans in late August to plan a sally in order to
capture the British guns. When Drummond moved his forces further
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back from the gun lines to a better encampment, Major-General
Jacob Brown, the American commander, saw his opportunity. He
launched the attack late on the 17 September, intending to capture
battery No. 3 and then roll up the other two. The Americans obtained
initial success, but then the British re-organized and counterattacked.
There was much confused and desperate fighting across the line with
outposts and battery positions frequently changing hands. Once the
British recaptured most of the positions, Brown broke off the fighting
and withdrew to the fort. As the last shots echoed over the battlefield,
the British started a much lengthier withdrawal back up the Niagara
peninsula to their winter positions at Burlington Heights. By 21
September, the British position had been completely abandoned.
This brief encounter had been costly to both sides: Brown lost 511
men— 79 killed, 216 wounded, and 216 missing; and Drummond lost
579 men— 115 killed, 148 wounded, and 316 missing.
By 1814 both sides had realized the importance of naval control
of the major waterways to the successful prosecution of the overall
campaign. Lieutenant-General Sir George Prevost, the British
commander-in-chief, had been reinforced by over 13,000 troops from
post-hostilities Europe during the summer, but their late arrival
precluded all but an attempt to seize control of Lake Champlain.
Prevost ordered his three brigades south from Montreal on the 30
August. A s Prevost’s forces pushed south the Americans, now under
Brigadier-General Alexander Macomb, fought a delaying action. By
the evening of the 6 September Prevost’s forces had closed up to the
Saranac River and occupied the northern half of Plattsburg. When
pressed to cross the river and conduct an immediate assault, MajorGeneral Frederick Robinson, the commander of the 1st Brigade,
refused as Prevost’s staff had not obtained the necessary intelligence
on fording points or on the strength of the enemy positions. This
un-readiness would characterize Prevost’s preparations: there was
order— counter-order— order; there was inadequate reconnaissance
for the final land assault; there was haphazard preparation of the
artillery positions; and there was the constant prodding of the British
naval commander, Captain George Downie, to hasten along his fleet
without the development of a combined plan. The Americans forces
were led by more vigorous and energetic commanders— Macomb by
land and Master Commandant Thomas Macdonough by sea. Fought
on the 11 September, the Battle of Plattsburg was largely a desperate
and punishing naval encounter which the British quickly lost. On
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seeing the British ships striking their colours, Prevost recalled
his assault columns just as they were closing up to the American
positions. Later that evening Prevost’s forces began their rain-soaked
retreat back to Canada. For the Americans, the defence of Plattsburg
was an overwhelming success. Though Prevost had preserved his
forces to fight another day, one of his strategic aims throughout the
war, his handling of campaign over these two weeks would tarnish his
reputation and soon lead to his recall.
There are a. number of minor issues with this book. First, it has
become the habit for authors writing on the War of 1812 to include
side-portraits of the key participants but the same ones so frequently
appear that they have become overused. Further, in this book several
of the entries suffer from merely repeating what is described close
by in the text and in some instances the side-portrait, like that of
Commander Alexander Dobbs, is at odds with the text. Second, this
trilogy appears to have been written for a large audience with widely
different tastes and whereas some of the modern photographs may
aid battlefield tourists they contribute little to the narrative. Finally,
Graves likes to describe the “after the battle” lives of the main actors,
which presupposes an emotional attachment that I would suggest is
not as strong for most readers as for an author who has spent hours,
days and years exploring the detail of their lives.
O f more substantial nature, though Graves has provided a strong
and well balanced narrative of events, those seeking in-depth analysis
will have to seek it elsewhere. Graves proves good at puncturing some
of the myths that have evolved around select events of the war. For
instance, he rehabilitates the reputation of Lieutenant-Colonel William
Drummond from his utterance of “no quarter” during the assault
of Fort Erie and the logistic necessity of Drummond’s withdrawal
after the sortie. There are a few points where more detailed analysis
would have been useful. For instance, why were both Drummond’s
and Prevost’s siege operations similarly inept and why did Downie
give up the advantage of his long guns to close, at his hazard, with
the American fleet on the morning of the 11th- More importantly,
Prevost’s actual plan demands more explanation. Combined land
and sea. operations were well practiced having occurred at Sackets
Harbour, Oswego and even during the Burlington Races. W hy was
Prevost’s plan at Plattsburg not a combined one? A final comment
bears on Graves’ treatment of key British leaders: Drummond is
treated charitably even given the butcher’s bill at Fort Erie; Prevost is

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol24/iss2/20

4

ll Their Glory Past: Fort Erie, Plattsburgh and the Final Battles in the North, 1814 (Book Review)" by Donald
C A N A D I A N M I L I T A R Y H I S T O R Y : 313

rehabilitated along the lines of John Grodzinski’s Defender of Canada
(2013) despite his shortcomings as an operational commander; and
Commodore James Yeo, the commander of British naval forces, is
treated as an impediment to operations, yet he did make significant
contributions as ably described in Robert Malcomson’s Lords of the
Lake (1998).
Despite these criticisms, And A ll Their Glory Past is a fine
concluding volume to this trilogy and covers the closing period of the
War of 1812 in an entertaining and lucid fashion. Its breadth and
scope make it useful to both historians and students alike.
RICH ROY, PHD, INDEPENDENT RESEARCHER

Caen Controversy: The Battle for Sword Beach IQ44. Andrew
Stewart. Solihul: Helion & Company, 2014. Pp. 164.
Caen Controversy is a narrative account of the activities and
performance of the 3 (British) Infantry Division that fought in
the Sword sector on the eastern flank of the D-Day landings in
Normandy. In order to contextualise the Division’s progress inland
the book also describes the preparations for the landings, the
supporting activities of the 6 Airborne Division, which protected
the left flank of the Allied forces, and it assesses the capabilities
and challenges facing the German defenders. The book’s aim is to
analyse the performance of the assaulting officers and soldiers, in
the context of the objectives set for them, to examine their relative
success. Stewart’s narrative closes on the evening of 6 June 1944
when, although a solid lodgement had been secured away from the
beaches, the objective of Caen had not been taken.
The controversy described in the book stems from an enduring
perception that 3 Br Inf Div was excessively cautious in advancing
towards Caen and was affected by an offensive malaise which
permeated staff and soldiers alike. The French, of course, might
consider any controversy relating to Caen in terms of the deaths
of over a thousand French civilians killed by the Allied Air Forces
bombing of the city in June and July 1944, something that still
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